Description

Goals

Documentation Uses

Overview

Background

Contributors

Classes of Attack

Contact

Appendix

License


Contributors

Robert Auger
Ryan Barnett
Yuval Ben-Itzhak
Erik Caso
Cesar Currudo
Sacha Faust
JD Glaser
Jeremiah Grossman
Sverre H. Huseby
Amit Klein
Mitja Kolsek
Aaron C. Newman
Steve Orrin
Bill Pennington
Ray Pompon
Mike Shema
Ory Segal
Caleb Sima



Credential/Session Prediction
Credential/Session Prediction is a method of hijacking or impersonating a web site user. Deducing or guessing the unique value that identifies a particular session or user accomplishes the attack. Also known as Session Hijacking, the consequences could allow attackers the ability to issue web site requests with the compromised user's privileges.

Many web sites are designed to authenticate and track a user when communication is first established. To do this, users must prove their identity to the web site, typically by supplying a username/password (credentials) combination. Rather than passing these confidential credentials back and forth with each transaction, web sites will generate a unique "session ID" to identify the user session as authenticated. Subsequent communication between the user and the web site is tagged with the session ID as "proof" of the authenticated session. If an attacker is able predict or guess the session ID of another user, fraudulent activity is possible.

Example
Many web sites attempt to generate session IDs using proprietary algorithms. These custom methodologies might generation session IDs by simply incrementing static numbers. Or there could be more complex procedures such as factoring in time and other computer specific variables.

The session ID is then stored in a cookie, hidden form-field, or URL. If an attacker can determine the algorithm used to generate the session ID, an attack can be mounted as follows:

1) attacker connects to the web application acquiring the current session ID.
2) attacker calculates or Brute Forces the next session ID.
3) attacker switches the current value in the cookie/hidden form- field/URL and assumes the identity of the next user.

References
"iDefense: Brute-Force Exploitation of Web Application Session ID's", By David Endler - iDEFENSE Labs
http://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/SessionIDs.pdf

"Best Practices in Managing HTTP-Based Client Sessions", Gunter Ollmann - X-Force Security Assessment Services EMEA
http://www.itsecurity.com/papers/iss9.htm

"A Guide to Web Authentication Alternatives", Jan Wolter
http://www.unixpapa.com/auth/homebuilt.html



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