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RE: [WEB SECURITY] Bypassing URL Authentication and Authorization with HTTP Verb Tampering
- From: Gunter Ollmann <gollmann@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: RE: [WEB SECURITY] Bypassing URL Authentication and Authorization with HTTP Verb Tampering
- Date: Thu, 29 May 2008 13:10:13 -0400
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Hi Ashran...
"Arshan Dabirsiaghi" <arshan.dabirsiaghi@aspectsecurity.com> wrote on
05/29/2008 11:55:59 AM:
> we're not claiming to invent verb tampering. I was personally taken
> aback when I actually looked at the RFC and tested the various
> vendors. I simply could not believe anyone else had not done this.
And you we're right, you shouldn't have believed that anyone else had n=
ot
already done this. You may want to note that several IDS/IPS vendors ha=
d
already crafted rules/signatures/decodes within their products to prote=
ct
against the malicious forms of the vector - not because it was an unkno=
wn.
In future testing you may want to also evaluate how some of the mainstr=
eam
IDS/IPS technologies protect against the vector. I'd be curious.
> There was nothing we could find that pointed to other people doing th=
is
before
> Verb tampering is something that we thought many pen testers (and
> some tools, like Sentinel) have done at some point, but not as part
> of any standard methodology or to specifically evade a particular
mechanism
> I'm actually a little relieved to see that NGS and IIS had played in
> this area before, even if they had not published on it. Share-
> nothing attitudes, though, won't get us very far as a community
> (which I'm sensing may not actually exist).
I'm sorry, but you're kidding right? Just because you couldn't find it =
on a
search engine you appear to be asserting that the knowledge hasn't been=
in
use or isn't shared. This is not the case from my perspective. Like you=
mention, tools and pentesters are aware of this vector and have made us=
e of
it for consulting purposes. This isn't a black art - or it would have h=
ad
to have been discovered independently by hundreds of consultants.
I also don't believe that "Share-nothing" attitudes apply here. Like I
stated in the earlier email some consulting companies refer to it in th=
eir
public courses, and I've fairly positive that you'll find aspects of it=
in
multiple books on pentesting and application testing (as a bullet point=
perhaps?). Something that's not free or easy-to-Google-for does not
necessarily mean that it's not already public.
Granted, it may not be in the current OWASP guide - but that's what
revisions are for, and sure, it should form a documented test case. But=
it's also not a case of "the sky is falling".
You wrote a nice paper describing the problem and the vector and I
congratulate you on that - I know personally how much effort goes in to=
doing papers like this - and you've made the problem visible to a few m=
ore
people. But lets leave it at that - there are plenty of other security
problems seeking solutions...
Cheers,
Gunter
=
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<html><body>
<p>Hi Ashran...<br>
<tt>"Arshan Dabirsiaghi" <arshan.dabirsiaghi@aspectsecurit=
y.com> wrote on 05/29/2008 11:55:59 AM:<br>
> we're not claiming to invent verb tampering. I was personally take=
n <br>
> aback when I actually looked at the RFC and tested the various <br=
>
> vendors. I simply could not believe anyone else had not done this.=
<br>
</tt><br>
<tt>And you we're right, you shouldn't have believed that anyone else h=
ad not already done this. You may want to note that several IDS/IPS ven=
dors had already crafted rules/signatures/decodes within their products=
to protect against the malicious forms of the vector - not because it =
was an unknown. In future testing you may want to also evaluate how som=
e of the mainstream IDS/IPS technologies protect against the vector. I'=
d be curious.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>> There was nothing we could find that pointed to other people d=
oing this before</tt><br>
<tt>> Verb tampering is something that we thought many pen testers (=
and <br>
> some tools, like Sentinel) have done at some point, but not as par=
t <br>
> of any standard methodology or to specifically evade a particular =
mechanism</tt><br>
<tt>> I'm actually a little relieved to see that NGS and IIS had pla=
yed in<br>
> this area before, even if they had not published on it. Share-<br>=
> nothing attitudes, though, won't get us very far as a community <b=
r>
> (which I'm sensing may not actually exist).</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>I'm sorry, but you're kidding right? Just because you couldn't find=
it on a search engine you appear to be asserting that the knowledge ha=
sn't been in use or isn't shared. This is not the case from my perspect=
ive. Like you mention, tools and pentesters are aware of this vector an=
d have made use of it for consulting purposes. This isn't a black art -=
or it would have had to have been discovered independently by hundreds=
of consultants.</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>I also don't believe that "Share-nothing" attitudes apply=
here. Like I stated in the earlier email some consulting companies ref=
er to it in their public courses, and I've fairly positive that you'll =
find aspects of it in multiple books on pentesting and application test=
ing (as a bullet point perhaps?). Something that's not free or easy-to-=
Google-for does not necessarily mean that it's not already public.</tt>=
<br>
<br>
<tt>Granted, it may not be in the current OWASP guide - but that's what=
revisions are for, and sure, it should form a documented test case. Bu=
t it's also not a case of "the sky is falling".</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>You wrote a nice paper describing the problem and the vector and I =
congratulate you on that - I know personally how much effort goes in to=
doing papers like this - and you've made the problem visible to a few =
more people. But lets leave it at that - there are plenty of other secu=
rity problems seeking solutions...</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>Cheers,</tt><br>
<br>
<tt>Gunter</tt><br>
<br>
</body></html>=
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