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Re: [WEB SECURITY] Re: Jeremiah Grossman writes about buffer overflow myths



Sorry for my latent reply, I was traveling when the article published. I had read "Blind Buffer Overflows In ISAPI Extensions" in the past and was intrigued by the research. Good stuff. The article focused on proof-of-concept examples how blind buffer overflows COULD be achieved in specific situations. However, it did not go into the probably of such attacks actually succeeding. Nor did it need to because that was not its intended purpose.

What the author does say in the first paragraph...

"It is the author's belief that these attacks do happen and will most likely increase the more software products are secured against easily exploitable flaws and as attackers shift focus to exploiting proprietary solutions."

I took to mean buffer overflow attacks in web application happen, but the implication is rarely. And as easier to web app sec flaws are resolved (possibly meaning XSS and SQL Injection), we'll see attacks moving towards this area. So myself and the author are probably not in disagreement.

Also, Andrew van der Stock earlier in the thread informed us that buffer overflows will be cast out of the new Top-10. A good step in the right direction.

Either way your right, I should have referenced the work, it was an oversight on my part. For those interested in the topic, this is well worth a read.

Regards,

Jeremiah-






On Mar 15, 2006, at 11:40 PM, <ol@xxxxxxxxx> <ol@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

The article you posted is a good read, however it does not entirely debunk
the core message of Jeremiah's article.

But it did show that "slim" & "custom" in the same article is a very
black/white view which should have more shades of grey.

With these caveats in mind - is this really a blind buffer overflow if it
is a requirement that denied bytes are displayed back to the attacker?

But that would be in cases where there is user input validation, you may be
able to deduce the denied bytes through normal application operation without
them being displayed back the user. The fact the author includes one caveat
doesn't invalidate the research... it' like saying if all applications
included user input validation SQL injection wouldn't exist. While maybe
true it's highly unrealistic that "all" would.


"One can now see that even when an attacker does not have access to the
binary, source or platform information, exploitation may *in some specific
scenarios* allow for remote code execution."


Yes but this sounds a little more practical than "slim", it proves the point
that custom applications which suffer bufferoverflows can be exploited
blindly without code access (my original point)..


This brings up another point from Jeremiah's article - the likelihood of a
buffer overflow is less then the other attacks he mentioned (SQL Injection,
etc...)


I don't believe I disagreed with this.. of course, but that's like comparing
apples and oranges. One could argue that's for a number of reasons not least
that the languages which a majority of web applications are written in are
typically less (if at all) susceptible to bufferoverflow conditions which
are exploitable in native code.


My original point was never say never (and slim way too strong), and while
complex and not as easy as "' OR 1=1--" the following is true:
- Buffer overflows can and will be found in custom web applications when
written in appropriate languages (via fuzzing or what ever techniques you
prefer)
- In at least one instance (ISAPI is the one to hand) these overflows in
"custom" code could be exploited blindly without access to the server or
source


I felt if the article was being fair and honest it should of referenced
Isaac's work... In short I don't believe overflows in custom web apps has
been myth busted...


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